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Academic precarity as 
hierarchical dependence in the 
Max Planck Society
Vita Peacock, University College London
This essay examines the idiosyncratic internal hierarchy of Germany’s foremost research 
organization, the Max Planck Society. It employs Louis Dumont’s analytics of paramount 
value, encompassment, and complementarity to convey the symbolic logic of relations 
therein. One consequence of this is to show that the organization’s paramount values 
of autonomy and excellence (embodied by its governing community of directors who 
encompass their departments) produce the complementary value of dependence for 
subalterns. Ethnographic engagement with three post-PhD scientists demonstrates that 
dependence is thereby constituted as a “mode of action” in James Ferguson’s terms, which 
hinges on their director’s support. The essay concludes that the ubiquity of temporary 
contracts among these actors does not arise simply—as many presume—from a generic 
neoliberal precariatization of the academy. Instead, precarity of employment in the Max 
Planck Society is the contemporary expression of dependencies initiated by a far older 
tradition of intellectual leadership, and the morphologies of German monarchy that 
preceded it.
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In the last three decades precarity and its cognates, precarious and precarious-
ness, have been advancing as categories to describe a new regime of labor. The 
process began sometime in the mid-1980s, when labor economists and political 
scientists began to attend to a seismic shift unfolding in their data. They were con-
fronted with more and more evidence of deviation from the so-called “standard 
employment relationship”—meaning “full-time, regular and permanent employ-
ment” (Deakin 1986: 225)—that had characterized the postwar settlement. On the 
back of the 1970s employment crisis and a general slowing of employment growth 
through the 1980s, a new “atypical” or “nonstandard” employment relationship was 
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appearing with greater frequency (Rodgers and Rodgers 1989): temporary or con-
tract work, home-working, self-employment, part-time work and irregular work in 
the black economy (Ruberry 1989). At the same time, national governments were 
systematically loosening previously standardized and collectivized labor controls, 
rendering this once “atypical” employment increasingly typical—as part of a pro-
cess now called neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). The expansion of precarious forms 
of work—which by the 1990s had come to signify all that was somehow temporary 
(Bosworth 1991; European Foundation 1997; Vosko 2000)—was thus conceived as 
one of the primary consequences of this new politico-economic order.
More recently, there has been a charged discussion around the effects of this 
order on academic institutions. These have been broadly conceived as attacks on 
disciplinary integrity (Dyck 2014; Mitchell and Dyck 2014; Kapferer 2005); the 
dramatic expansion of audit (Strathern 2000) and its attendant ranking practices 
(Groat 2015); and attempts to substitute academic for nonacademic values, particu-
larly economic (Hall and Sanders 2015; Garland 2008; Knowles and Burrows 2014; 
Mitchell 2014). In tandem with these, an ideological logic of “responsibilization” 
(Butler and Athanasiou 2013)—which legitimates the transference of structures 
of social and economic risk from governments and institutions onto individuals 
(Beck 1992)—has been widely regarded as the culprit for the normalization of pre-
carious employment within the academy (Giroux 2014; Maroudas and Nikolaidis 
2013; Teeuwen and Hantke 2007).
As such, the neoliberal enterprise and its effects felt apposite to my initial en-
counter with the post-PhD scientists of the Max Planck Society (alternatively the 
Society or MPS).1 The MPS is a large-scale nonprofit research organization spread 
over eighty-three Institutes across Germany with five abroad; and one of its most 
particular anthropological features is the profoundly polarized temporal experi-
ence of its workforce. The large majority of scientists below the director stratum 
are employed on temporary contracts; meanwhile the large majority of its tech-
nical staff and administrative staff, along with the directors of the Institutes, are 
employed there permanently. The Society’s post-PhD staff thus offered an excel-
lent example of precarious living. As a consequence, I excitedly drew up several 
graphs on how the organization’s contractual commitments to its employees had 
declined since the early 1990s.2 I also listened with great interest to the scientists’ 
1. I spent a total of fifteen months from 2010 to 2012 at various MPS sites across 
Germany. These included four distinct Institutes (in Berlin Brandenburg and North 
Rhine-Westphalia), the bureaucratic headquarters in Munich, and the Society’s Castle 
in Alpine Bavaria. It is important to be clear from the outset—particularly for the ben-
efit of my disciplinary colleagues working inside the organization—that all of these 
Institutes were engaged in natural scientific research. The empirical basis of this study, 
and therefore this argument, is one that extends only to the natural scientific relations 
of knowledge production in the MPS. Nevertheless, over the years since beginning 
this project, I have heard many similar tales of individualized dependence relations in 
German institutions beyond this sphere, and I would not wish the limits of my claims 
to obstruct a broader resonance elsewhere.
2. I compiled two graphs on the contractual nature of scientific employment from 1974 
to 1994 and from 2002 to 2011, based on quantitative data gleaned from the MPS’s 
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descriptions of their lives and attitudes, which seemed to bear all the hallmarks 
of precarious subjectivity: a preferential focus on the present, an ability to man-
age high levels of “stranger sociality” (Povinelli 2006), and even a love of extreme 
sports like air-gliding, rock-climbing, and snowboarding (Baker and Simon 2002). 
It seemed sufficient to theorize the experiences of the MPS’s scientific staff as those 
of just another precarious group, whose employment situation had brought with it 
a characteristic “way of life” (Berlant 2011: 192). It took me some time to realize 
that to do this was to neglect the organization as a cultural space: i.e., one where 
historic convictions about what relationships should be overdetermine those that 
end up developing.
In an apparent paradox, the very etymology of precarity provides the key to 
unlock this space. Precarity is a dead metaphor of landholding. Its cognate “pre-
carious” first appeared in the English language in 1646 as a legal term to signify a 
particular form of contract between landlord and tenant. From the Latin precārius 
meaning “obtained by prayer” (Skeat 1910: 470), a precarious tenancy was one in 
which land was held “at the will of ” or “at the pleasure of ” the landholder (OED 
2014)—with no promise of security nor permanence beyond that assured by such 
will or pleasure. To my knowledge it is only Lauren Berlant who has made the 
connection between precarity’s heritage and its present-day form. She tantalizes 
the reader with an almost throwaway remark that precarity is “at root, a condition 
of dependency” (2011: 192, emphasis added) before soaring off into the theoretical 
constellations of a “neoliberal feedback loop” (2011: 193). Instead of joining Ber-
lant on this cosmic leap I’d like to keep the argument chthonic. I want to hold onto 
the insight that precarity is a condition of dependence because it is this that enables 
us to make that E. P. Thompson-esque knights-move (1963), reframing a sociologi-
cal category as anthropological: that is, as a social relation.3 If a precarious existence 
is one side of a reciprocal dynamic in which one lives at the will or pleasure of an-
other person, then the first question that follows is—precisely who is this person?
In the Max Planck Society, the vast majority of post-PhD scientists are em-
ployed to work within a specific department that is governed by an appointed di-
rector (who is also a scientist).4 This director is responsible for all hiring decisions 
as well as the overall direction of research the department pursues, pouring his or 
her funding streams this way or that. Although they have their own projects, these 
Annual Reports (Jahresberichte) housed in the Max Planck Archive. These statistics 
make two things abundantly clear: i) that the total population of the organization has 
increased by a multiple during this 37-year period, and ii) this explosion has made 
the differing proportions of those on permanent and temporary contracts far more 
pronounced.
3. One reviewer proposed the relevance of Pierre Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus (1988) to 
this argument. While it is indeed relevant, this is perhaps not in the way that was pre-
sumed. Bourdieu’s project has a wholly inverse relation to the one I am pursuing here: 
animating, as he does, the economic language of capital in the analysis of academic 
personhood.
4. This description does not include those employed within the Max Planck Research 
Groups: small teams of researchers who work independently from any director but are 
usually restricted to a maximum life cycle of five years.
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scientists work, in the final analysis, “at the pleasure of ” the director because these 
must be successfully subsumed within the latter’s broad vision.5,6
The directorship is an unusually pronounced concept of leadership, with mor-
phological roots in the governance of hundreds of principalities of the Holy Roman 
Empire (Vierhaus 1988). In the wake of the French Revolution, the self-designated 
“German Idealists” (notably Fichte, Herder, and Humboldt) effectively asserted 
for German intellectuals the societal significance once the property of these ruling 
princes—positioning learned men as Kulturträger (culture-bearers) of a new inte-
grated German nation (Boyer 2005: 57). Turn now to 1911 when the Max Planck 
Society’s predecessor, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, is founded, and it is this particu-
lar admixture of leadership that becomes the defining social fact of the new institu-
tion. When the 1980s brings with it a broad trend for those in weaker occupational 
locations to be stripped of permanent positions, this begins to directly affect those 
beneath the director stratum when the organization undergoes seismic change af-
ter the reunification of Germany in 1990. However, the decline in wissenschaftliche 
Planstellen (permanent scientific posts) never reaches the directors—whose num-
bers have remained fairly constant and who have as much contractual security as 
they ever did. Casting back to the feudal history of precarity thus sheds its apparent 
paradox, because the insulation of the directors from these trends can only be ex-
plained through the persistence of a much older societal logic.7 For if the monarch 
is the source of “life” and of social “reproduction” (da Col and Graeber 2011: xxiii), 
then he (and now she) must be maintained in a position of total safety. And if the 
monarch is the source of life, s(he) is also the principal avenue for those around 
them to realize theirs.
Precarity as dependence
The question of dependence has recently been discussed in some depth by James Fer-
guson and seven commentators (Ferguson 2013; Bolt 2013; Bonilla 2013; Englund 
2013; Haynes 2013; Li 2013; Shah 2013; White 2013). For Ferguson dependence is 
5. There are two caveats. First, two institutes in North Rhine-Westphalia are half financed 
by German industry, diminishing the intellectual control of the directors therein. Sec-
ond, there is one way around the material dependence of subalterns upon the direc-
tor, which is in the securing of third-party funding. However, on the latter point the 
remarks about intellectual encompassment still apply.
6. To argue that post-PhD scientists exist in a relation of hierarchical dependence upon 
their directors is not to say that the latter possess no reciprocal obligations. Indeed the 
majority of directors I met exhibited a profound sense of responsibility for the career 
progression of those in their charge (see my discussion of hierarchy and responsibility 
in Peacock [2015]). Nonetheless, the directors are manifestly not dependent upon their 
staff for their positions within the organization (this rests with other scientific mem-
bers), making the quality of these obligations rather different.
7. It also allows us to elude a political concern raised by Keir Martin (2014) that I also 
share: namely, to assume all forms of precarity are necessarily “neoliberal” is itself an 
intellectual capitulation to the ideology.
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an inherently hierarchical relation. This means that the primary plane of interac-
tion is not between people—“abstract individuals” (Kapferer 2005: 8) acting in ap-
parent freedom—but between persons—people inhabiting social roles conceived as 
functionally interdependent. Ferguson’s clear intellectual adversary is the tradition 
of liberal thought that has pathologized (Fraser and Gordon 1994) dependence as a 
condition of shameful passivity. Instead, he argues, in southern Africa the opposite 
has historically been true. There, dependence is a cultural “mode of action” (2013: 
237) that presents a means of realizing human potential rather than obliterating it.
Ferguson’s most provocative and valuable contribution is the notion of “desir-
able” (2013: 237) dependence, a subject many of his interlocutors acknowledge has 
been woefully ignored. All accept the premise that dependence can be a mode of 
action—in Africa (Haynes 2013) as well as elsewhere in the Global South (Bonilla 
2013)—and in rescuing dependence from the throes of liberal pathology Ferguson 
“recovers intellectual resources within the discipline” (Englund 2013: 248). These 
resources also enrich an understanding of the Max Planck Society. I am often told 
by scientists that “everything depends on the director” as a simple statement of 
cultural fact.8 Dependence is the way the MPS “works,” and must be evenly and 
reflexively negotiated if it is to offer them a mode of action. On encountering desir-
able dependence in this German organization, however, one underlying assump-
tion these scholars share is contravened: namely, dependence is not a conception of 
relations that societies in Europe would ever approbate.9 When MPS scientists say 
that everything depends on the director without any evidence of a liberal “repug-
nance” (Mahmood 2005) they are showing this is not necessarily the case. A differ-
ent model of personhood lives inside this German organization that is decidedly 
nonliberal. Part of the story of this essay is therefore how and why the Max Planck 
Society has been able to resist a particular strand of Western liberal thought, retain-
ing dependence as potentially desirable.
In asserting that the Society is organized through a hierarchical relation I am 
also pursuing certain propositions of Louis Dumont: in particular his notions of 
paramount value, encompassment, and complementarity.10 Dumont’s study of the 
arrangement of castes in India leads him to the structuralist conclusion that there 
8. Such a statement is often asserted as reasoning for why an anthropology of the Max 
Planck Society would be impossible, all departments being too different to enable com-
parison. Of course, this very diversity proves the converse is true: each department 
constitutes one iteration of the shared cultural idiom of director-dependence.
9. Iteanu and Moya, in a recent appraisal of Dumont’s comparative project, also take the 
same position: that across this cultural space all hierarchical relations are construed as 
domination (2015: 118).
10. Although hierarchy—whether “formal” or “informal” (Diefenbach and Sillince 2011)—
is often acknowledged as a facet of organizational life, this is the first application of Du-
mont’s thought to the ethnography of an organization. This may be at least partly due 
to the latter’s profound influence by postmodern and poststructuralist theory, which 
asserts the primacy of action and the interminable production of social life (Born 1995; 
Kunda 1992; Latour 2010; Law 1994; Zaloom 2006). The analysis of value inside orga-
nizations has thus in recent decades been very marginal (although see Kondo [1990] 
and Garsten [1994]).
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is a single “paramount value” that shapes the entire system: religious purity.11 Purity 
for Dumont is like an “immense umbrella sheltering all sorts of things which we 
distinguish” (1980: 60), and one of its clearest social consequences is the hierarchi-
cal preeminence of Brahmans, conceived as the purest group.12 As his image sug-
gests, however, rather than a linear hierarchy of degrees of relative purity, Dumont’s 
conception of Indian society is taxonomic, operating through “a series of successive 
.  .  . inclusions” (1980: 67). Purity is consequently not separate from its opposite 
but instead encompasses it within itself. In fact, he maintains, without impurity 
there could be no purity; the two are “conceptually inseparable” (1980: 54). It is the 
functional interdependence of these opposites that Dumont calls complementarity. 
Purity’s encompassment of its contrary is, in fact, the only way it can realize itself 
as a paramount value.
Hierarchy in this German setting arises, of course, from a very different set of 
conditions to the Indian case, thus Dumontian thought must be adapted to its nu-
ances. In fact, there is really one clear distinction on which all others turn, which 
is in the embodiment of paramount values. For Dumont this is unmistakably a 
group—the Brahmans—yet in the MPS these values are embodied by individuals—
the directors. However, Joel Robbins points out Dumont’s acknowledgement that 
the individual as a carrier of value always rested on a fallacy—that one can ever be 
fully separate from society. Robbins’s conclusion is that “individualism must always 
be found in some combination with holism” (2015: 174), and this is unmistak-
ably what we find in the MPS: where this combination is one of encompassment. 
Each individual director stands thus encompasses the whole of their departmental 
community. Dumont himself gets halfway there, by calling German ideology some 
combination of “community holism and self-cultivating individualism” (1994: 20), 
in a work that André Iteanu and Ismaël Moya suggest shows Dumont’s ability to 
accept flaws in his earlier reasoning (2015: 116). I find this perhaps too forgiving. 
The text remains torn with ambivalences, Dumont quite unable to see how indi-
vidualism and holism could coherently work together.13 Presenting the Max Planck 
Society as a hierarchical system in which individualism not only operates alongside 
but also actually encompasses holism within itself is subsequently to take Dumont’s 
thought to a logical conclusion that he was never able to.
This brings us full circle to the theoretical submission of precarity as a form of 
dependence. If paramount value in the MPS is attached most fully to its directors—
who incarnate the values of autonomy and excellence—then complementarity im-
plies that the group they encompass as individuals must be dependent. Indeed, just 
as with Dumont’s purity, the autonomy of the directors can only be realized as a 
11. Dumont sometimes uses different language to describe the same phenomenon. 
Elsewhere this is also referred to as the “preeminent value-idea” (1986: 231).
12.  Joel Robbins has reinterpreted the paramount value with a different visual analogy 
that is perhaps even more helpful. It is, for Robbins, like a “rather busy mobile with 
many separate and balanced arms that are all, in the last analysis, dependent upon and 
coordinated in their movement by a central string” (1994: 28).
13. This would suggest that while Dumont’s relentless comparativism opened up fresh 
lines of inquiry, it also foreclosed others.
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paramount value by the dependence of their subalterns. Dependence is autonomy’s 
functional complement—for if the directors were indeed totally autonomous they 
would be without the social and material support necessary to realize their scien-
tific visions.
It is profoundly important to note here that this relation of complementarity has 
a remarkably long history in Germany. Indeed Fritz Ringer’s salutary portrait (1969) 
of German universities at the end of the nineteenth century has many echoes with 
what we see taking place in the Max Planck Society today. The hegemony of the full 
professors (who also governed the institutions) was dramatically enhanced when 
enrolment boomed after the unification of Germany in 1871. While their numbers 
increased only marginally, those of associate professors and Privatdozenten (quite 
literally “private lecturers”—a hyper-precariat paid per lecture by each student who 
attended) grew significantly—further hierarchizing the dual regime of autonomy 
for some and dependence for others that had been institutionalized since the early 
nineteenth century.
It could of course be argued that norms of hierarchical dependence are em-
blematic of academic institutions in general—being, as David Graeber points 
out, “among the only institutions that survived more or less intact from the High 
Middle Ages” (2014: 77). After all, the need for professional references from one’s 
elders never stops. Yet what is striking and comparatively unusual about the Max 
Planck Society is the widespread absence of tenure for post-PhD scientists in their 
30s and sometimes 40s, and moreover that this dependence is concentrated in one 
individual, rather than distributed among a community of superordinates. Before 
exploring its ethnographic consequences, let us now explore the transhistorical de-
velopment of its values in further depth.
The Society past and present
When the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (or KWS) was founded in 1911, it was with two 
distinct characteristics. The first was that, unlike the universities, it drew its legiti-
macy not from the German state but from the German monarchy. Indeed the new 
organization was verily saturated in the symbols of kingship. Kaiser Wilhelm II not 
only gave his name and profile as emblems of the new organization but also its in-
augural speech in which he offered his “protection” (cited in Vom Brocke 1990: 27). 
Kingship was there too implicitly in the form of social organization that the new 
institutes would adopt, each formed around a single leader drawn from the ranks 
of the intellectual elite. The second was that the KWS was to be an institution of 
great national significance, a pillar of Wilhelmine Sammlungspolitik (the politics of 
national cohesion) with the aim—much like the founding of the University of Ber-
lin—of building an institutional apex to concentrate the intellectual achievements 
of the German nation. This moment is key because it is here that the Society’s two 
paramount values are born—only today they are articulated rather differently. The 
values that survive are not kingship (which has been passionately repudiated) and 
patriotic supremacy (similarly so) but the more contemporarily acceptable values 
of autonomy and excellence. It is these that persist in the organization we know 
today.
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Of the two, it is the latter that impresses itself most visibly and quickly upon the 
passing stranger. Indeed in all of the Society’s promotional literature its most pithy 
and pervasive description of itself is simply, “Germany’s most successful research 
organization.” One of the ways it tends to illustrate this is through the number 
of Nobel Laureates the Society has produced, bronze busts of whom populate the 
Institutes—a clear example of how its paramount values find expression in indi-
viduals. More broadly, like all effective values excellence takes on an almost air-like 
form inside the organization: the stranger is inhaling it even when he or she is not 
necessarily aiming to. It can be found in the striking and unorthodox modernist 
buildings in which the Institutes house themselves, in the sleek sheen of a newly-
purchased instrument costing a cool 100,000 Euros, or in the clear-eyed exuber-
ance of its student workforce. The Max Planck Society’s drive for excellence does 
not attempt to conceal itself in secrecy or dissimulate through false humility; it is a 
value both bold and boldly stated. To enter the Society’s administrative headquar-
ters in Munich, the stranger must pass over a thin strip of water resembling a castle 
moat. Engraved on the stone bridge underfoot read two lines of ancient Greek, 
“Full of desire and love, always to be the best and distinguished above the sum of 
all others.”14
Autonomy, on the other hand, is a paramount value with a more subterranean 
existence. It lives beneath the surface but can be rapidly unearthed if one traces 
the organization’s development through the last century. This may seem counter-
intuitive now, but at its inception autonomy was to be achieved by financing from 
private donors. The Kaiser Wilhelm Society would guard its separation from the 
state by appealing to individual and corporate sponsors drawn from the ranks of 
Germany’s wealthy industrial class—many of whom were personal acquaintances 
of its founder and first president, Adolf von Harnack. This was in part because the 
turn of the twentieth century was a time of profound crisis for the German uni-
versity system (Ringer 1969). That the Kaiser Wilhelm Society would be a purely 
research-oriented organization with only a negligible quantity of state funding was 
thus from the outset an effort to distance itself from the universities and their woes. 
It would be formally registered as a GmbH—a private rather than a public organi-
zation.15 One result of this was that the Society was exempt from the laws governing 
civil servants: a fact that intriguingly had several progressive consequences such as 
the legal employment of women and non-Germans.
State autonomy was to be short-lived however, as by the 1930s the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society had become intimately embroiled in some of the Nazis’ worst 
atrocities (Heim, Sachse, and Walker 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, after 
its closure at the end of the war and subsequent rebirth with support from the allies 
(Oexle 1995) as the Max Planck Society in 1948, the desire for autonomy took on 
both a greater fervor (Ebersold 1998) and a wildly different form. Article 1.2 of its 
founding statutes recapitulated and extended this value in no uncertain terms. The 
14. Ποθου πληρης και στοργης αιεν αριστευειν και υπειροχον εμμεναι αλλων.
15. This stands for “Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung,” in English, “a company with 
limited liability.” This particular legal status was established in Germany in 1892, and 
means that it is a private enterprise but also that the accountability for debts and bank-
ruptcy falls to the state rather than the owners.
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Society was to be “a union of free research institutes, that belonged neither to the 
state nor to the economy. They shall carry out scientific research in full freedom 
and independence, being constrained not by contracts, but only by the rule of law” 
(Henning, Kazemi, and Ullmann1998: 17–18).16 Due to the nefarious activities of 
the KWG, which were partly enabled by the political medium of private sponsor-
ship (including the notorious chemicals firm I. G. Farben), autonomy had to be 
asserted not simply from the German state but also from the potential corrup-
tions of commercial interests. Instead of a GmbH, the MPS thus began life as an 
eingetragener Verein (e.V)—a public organization.17 The agreement laid down in 
Königstein stipulated the financial arrangement that would secure this status: the 
Institutes were to be financed half by the federal government and half by the state 
in which each Institute is located.18 The Max Planck Society thus turned in the 
diametrically opposite direction from its predecessor in a financial sense, seeing 
the security of state funding (but with political intervention expressly prohibited) 
as the method to ensure the Institutes would remain “free.” However the value of 
scientific autonomy not only successfully straddled the rupture between the two 
organizations but in fact grew stronger as a consequence of the rupture itself. The 
state-orchestrated horrors undertaken by the privately-funded KWS are some of 
the reasons why the MPS has been able to guard both its political and commercial 
autonomy so effectively thus far.19
The singular embodiment of these values by departmental directors is codified 
by the contemporary discourse of the Harnack Principle. The latter takes its name 
from the organization’s founder, and offers a visible and well-defined idea of per-
sonhood through which the Society’s form of social organization reproduces itself. 
Surprisingly, however, Harnack never inscribed a principle during his lifetime. It 
was in actuality “only after Harnack’s death” in 1930 “that the principle became 
canonized” (Vierhaus 1996: 137), and has, in the decades since, been passed down 
through oral tradition by his successors.20 By examining the historical speeches of 
presidents and the testimonies of several standing directors, it can be thus interpre-
tively formulated in the following terms. The Harnack Principle ostensibly signifies 
a process whereby an exceptional scientist is discovered by the directorial commu-
nity, outside the borders of the organization, and at a relatively early stage of their 
16. This is my translation of the original German: “Eine Vereinigung freier Forschungsin-
stitute, die nicht dem Staat und nicht der Wirtschaft angehören. Sie betriebt die Wissen-
schaftliche Forschung in völliger Freiheit and Unabhängigkeit, ohne Bindung an Aufträge, 
nur dem Gesetz unterworfen.”
17. The principal difference between an e.V and a GmbH is that the former is explicitly 
noncommercial.
18. This arrangement is largely still in place, although as much as 20 percent of the Max 
Planck Society’s funding now comes from “third parties,” which include industrial 
sponsorship and patent royalties.
19. State funding of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society also substantially increased under the Na-
tional Socialists.
20. This is my translation of the original German: “es ist eigentlich erst nach Harnacks Tod 
‘kanonisiert’ worden.”
2016 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (1): 95–119
Vita Peacock 104
career (usually in their 30s or 40s). At this point they are invited to join the Society 
and to found a department from scratch, which will be accorded the space and the 
resources to spend the next twenty to thirty years pursuing a particular research 
direction.21 A more implicit aspect of the principle is that these individuals are not 
simply defining their own scientific research but also the character of the com-
munity performing it. This means hiring all of its scientific staff and deciding how 
to organize them; yet it can also mean determining what hours this staff works, 
their commensality rituals, and even what language they speak, whether German 
or English.22,23 The Max Planck Director thus maintains the classic Janus-face of the 
king (Sahlins 1981; Valeri [1980] 2014: 8–13): drawing authority from an external 
source, which is then translated internally.
Despite the continuity of the Harnack Principle since the 1930s, this is not to say 
it has gone unmodified or unchallenged. The 1960s and 1970s in particular were 
a turbulent time for the Society and its habits of self-governance. As mentioned, 
all of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes had been founded and organized around one 
central figurehead—eminent German scientists such as Albert Einstein and Max 
Planck himself—and this principle persisted after the war. It was only in 1964 that 
the directors sought to mollify the first wave of democratic critique by diluting 
this sharply tapered vision of leadership into the “collegial directorship” (Gerwin 
1996: 211) recognizable today—in which an Institute will be governed by anywhere 
from two to five directors. As the 1960s marched on however, it was clear that for 
many this reform was inadequate. Public resentment for what was still considered 
a deeply autocratic institution was so pronounced that in 1968 students pelted the 
directors with eggs as they entered their general meeting (Gerwin 1996). Thereaf-
ter it became clear the organization would require more visible restructuring if it 
was to see the century out. Two major democratic measures were finally voted in in 
1972, both of which operate energetically today. The first of these is the Fachbeirat 
or external advisory board: a form of audit culture avant-la-lettre in which estab-
lished scientists outside the Society are invited biannually to survey the work of the 
Institutes and submit a report to its president documenting their findings and rec-
ommendations. The purpose of the Fachbeirat is to exert reputational pressure on 
the directors to impress the board with their research outputs but also to dangle the 
threat of a possible cut in funding by the president if the report is a very negative 
one (although this is rare). The second measure was the introduction of a Betrieb-
srat or union, a representative body that all employees (excluding the directors) are 
permitted to join. Again, the Betriebsrat was similarly designed to constrain the 
21. My description is of a largely adhered-to ideal. This does not mean, however, that it is 
not contravened in all sorts of ways, not least by the fact that no less than eleven direc-
tors at the time of research ascended to the position directly from other Max Planck 
Institutes.
22. In some departments scientists are obliged to be present in their Institute at specified 
times, while others offer more flexibility in when and where scientists are able to per-
form their contracted hours.
23. My impression was that most directors chose English rather than German as their lin-
gua franca—one recently corroborated by current President Martin Stratmann in an 
interview with Die Zeit (Spiewak 2015).
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power of the directorships, who until that point could run the Institutes in what-
ever manner they chose.
So far, so progressive. Nonetheless it is difficult to see what effect these reforms 
have in practice on the scientific staff who are our concern here. The directorship 
may have become collegial, yet the directors are still the formal heads of the admin-
istration, meaning among other things that they have the final say on all matters of 
recruitment. The Fachbeirat may push the directors to keep the research standards 
of the Institutes high, yet the directors are still the primary authority that decides 
what this research will be. And the Betriebsrat may be a venerable and necessary 
social institution, yet in those Institutes I visited, these are dominated by the tech-
nical and administrative staff. Indeed, one union organizer, herself an administra-
tor, admitted to me that the scientists “don’t see it as a committee for them.” This 
is, of course, a matter of choice; however it is not hard to entertain the idea that the 
highly personalized scientific relations of the departments might work against tak-
ing recourse in formal representation.
In short, what examining the long history of the organization shows us is the 
“persistence and transformation” of its hierarchy (Rio and Smedal 2009), which is 
enacted through a changing discourse of values. The transformations are self-evi-
dent. The KWS begins life as an unabashed genuflection to monarchy (even retain-
ing the Kaiser’s profile as its heraldic symbol long after the latter had in fact abdi-
cated the throne), which is mirrored in the single-headed Institute. As the century 
continues (particularly after 1945) the values of kingship and private sponsorship 
as counterpowers to the German state are substituted for an increasingly reified 
discourse of “freedom” or autonomy from both state and industry, with Harnack 
rather than the Kaiser as its myth of origin. The tiny kingdoms of the institutes 
are subsequently split up into “collegial” directorships, and the power of the direc-
tors constrained by representative bodies. Of course, this discourse continues to 
evolve. The most recent perceptible shift is of President Martin Stratmann’s use of 
Harnack’s early vision to dissolve the boundary between basic and applied science 
(2014): a development that may presage the encouragement of closer links between 
directors and corporate actors.
Yet what is perhaps more interesting is the persistence of an older hierarchical 
form in the midst of this flurry of change, one that anthropologists have theorized 
as “kingship.”24 As I see it, the directorship ultimately possesses two major strands 
of continuity with this form. To begin with, the director’s appointment operates 
through the logic of kingly externality (whether Valeri’s “extraneous” authority 
[(1980) 2014: 8], Sahlins’s “stranger-kingship” [1981] or Graeber and Col’s “life 
from the outside” [2011: xx]). Extraordinary value is placed on the fact that direc-
tors are supposedly drawn from beyond the borders of the organization, any sem-
blance of inheritance being strictly taboo.25 While directors diverge from Sahlins’s 
24. The historical antecedents to the directorship I cited in the introduction all operated 
formally as kingships although they were not all named as such.
25. This is of course distinct from the many forms of kingship based on genealogical right. 
Indeed it is the institutionalization of stranger rather than autochthonous kingship that 
is the starkest point of divergence between the directorship and the old feudal monar-
chies (cf. Valeri [1980] 2014: 25).
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famous formulation (1980) in the sense that there is no society that precedes their 
arrival, they maintain this insider/outsider relation in their departments. One di-
rector remarked that they occupied a “strange and hybrid position.” Deriving from 
such sacred externality is the directorship’s second and most significant strand of 
continuity: that is, its retention of the king’s position as the essence of relatedness, 
and thus the source of social and cultural generativity (Graeber and Col 2011: xxiii; 
Valeri [1980] 2014: 1; Warnier 2007). Post-PhD scientists would certainly recog-
nize in their departmental relations Declan Quigley’s definition of the monarchical 
community, i.e., that “everyone is united by his or her common relation to the king” 
(2005: 5). It is this persistent centrality of the director that makes the Society’s re-
peated use of Harnack to transform its own values so interesting. By situating one 
individual (and incidentally, a Prussian German male) as the sole author of collec-
tive transformation, each iteration undertakes the mythological work necessary to 
maintain the symbolic force of the directorships. What Ferguson calls “liberal com-
mon sense” (2013: 237) has hence been held at arm’s length, underlying relations of 
dependence upon this key figure persisting unpathologized. To survive profession-
ally in the Max Planck Society, post-PhD scientists must therefore steer this mode 
of action in their favor. Now we turn to three cases of such efforts.
In the Institute for Nanoscience26
In 2010, I spent seven months at the Max Planck Institute for Nanoscience in the 
bucolic outskirts of Berlin.27 As many of its employees chose to lead urban lives in 
the city—just as I did—I got to know several of them on the commute into work. 
Each morning the scientists and I would tumble off the train at the station to begin 
the ten-minute stroll in. As the sun beat down in summer we chatted convivially in 
t-shirts and sunglasses as we walked, enjoying the delightful sight and scent of wild 
flowers hugging the long road. In winter the scene was rather bleaker. Armed with 
thick winter coats against an easterly wind and subzero temperatures, we crunched 
silently toward the Institute along a narrow passage in the snow. In all weathers a 
few hundred meters beyond the station the straight road curved to the left, and the 
26. This is a fictional institute in order to safeguard the anonymity of my research partici-
pants. Some details have been changed.
27. My methodology would be recognizable to any anthropologist of science, based as I 
was in a department in the Institute that undertook a mixture of experimental and 
computational work. This meant spending three or four days a week accompanying 
scientists and technicians during lab experiments, attending group meetings and de-
partmental seminars, and engaging members in a mixture of formal and informal 
interviews (a total of fifty-eight of the former across the Institute as a whole). I also 
spent four days away from Berlin-Brandenburg with the department on their annual 
“retreat” (Klausur). It is epistemologically relevant to note here that my ethnographic 
conversations extended to the Institute’s directors, including several with the director 
of the department where I was based, and also that I was formally prohibited from at-
tending the meetings between the latter and his cohort of group leaders. For further 
particularities on method please see Peacock (2013).
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Institute’s compound of buildings came into view, until then occluded by the boxy 
grey and blue start-up companies erected alongside it. Its aesthetic was exquisitely 
high-modern, with a carapace of dark grey corrugated iron, lined with unabash-
edly exuberant strips of yellow, pink, orange, green, and blue.
Inside, the appetite for exuberance continued. Murky pinks, terracotta oranges, 
and ocean blues covered the walls, while framed Technicolor scientific photographs 
hung from them like artworks. A series of over-large shrubs were planted directly 
into the ground floor, wonderfully disturbing the boundaries between inside and 
out, and a capacious airy library with glass walls on three levels looked out over 
them. Everywhere, large windows gave it a generous, open feel. The Society’s drive 
for excellence is thus not purely of the dry and easily audited kind but rather has 
strong colorful and nonrational aspects. Indeed, on walking through the main ar-
eas of the Institute, the visitor was saturated with a vivid sense of scientific “excite-
ment” (Begeisterung) that the organization claims is what drives it.
Color came to an abrupt halt, however, at the entrances to the corridors down 
which the scientists trickled to reach their labs and offices. Austere greys and whites 
clearly demarcated these spaces as sites of scientific production. At the end of each 
corridor sat a small breakout area with coffee-making facilities and several chairs 
around a table. Much like the library, the walls were again lined floor-to-ceiling 
with glass, meaning that of those facing over the internal courtyard, one’s gaze was 
naturally drawn to a large metal sculpture at its center. Two metal cuboid poles, 
each several meters high and planted separately on an axis in the ground, swung 
in long graceful arcs around each other as the wind steered them: an assemblage 
that seemed to capture both the robustness and fragility of life inside the Institute.
The MPI for Nanoscience was founded in 1994, as part of a wave of expansion 
into the former East Germany, and has been growing steadily ever since. During 
my visit, there were four departments and thus four directors, managing a total of 
just over 300 employees. The department in which I spent much of my time hosted 
fifty-six of these: of which eight were group leaders and four were independent 
researchers.28 These senior positions are structurally similar in the sense that their 
occupants are often of a similar age and on roughly the same salary scale. How-
ever, the group leaders are modestly preeminent as they will have a formal team 
of students and postdoctoral fellows focused on their own research interest, while 
independent researchers will usually work with other members of the department 
in a more loosely collaborative way. An independent research fellowship may also 
be a stepping stone into a group leader position; and thus the distinction between 
them can serve as a way to circumvent the “soft maximum” of five years in which 
any scientist (bar the directors) is usually permitted to stay in the Society. It was 
the wildly different experiences of three of these organizational persons that I shall 
now zoom in on.29
28. An “Independent Researcher” is an emic term referring to a post-PhD scientist who 
neither holds a Postdoctoral Fellowship, nor a Group Leader position.
29. It will be noted that all three individuals are male, although there is no mono-causal 
explanation for this. Statistically there are fewer women in the Institute at the post-
PhD level, constraining the pool of possible participants. However, it may equally be, 
as Victor Buchli has suggested (pers. comm.), that crossgender fieldwork relationships 
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Axel was a group leader in his forties, who had been hand-plucked by the di-
rector from the Germanophone city they both lived in, to help him initiate the 
department ten years previously. He was tall and full of life: a smile never far from 
his face and a joke never far from his speech, with a passion for natural science so 
infectious that even I got momentarily caught up in it. He was a long-term friend 
and colleague of the director, and although they came from separate fields, the two 
had already penned a number of key articles together as the sole coauthors. As the 
primary “stranger handler” (Agar 1980: 59) of the community—which as Michael 
Agar notes, is a position always indexing trust and high status—it was Axel who 
was placed in charge of my stay. His profound identification with the department 
was clear; when we crossed the threshold to another in the Institute he half-jok-
ingly referred to it as “enemy territory.” Axel’s perspective on the internal life of the 
department was thus of unqualified praise. “Not all research is as harmonious as in 
this department,” he told me knowingly one day. They were fortunate because in 
theory the director “could be a king if he wanted to”; yet “you do not feel it because 
he is very democratic.”
Axel was unequivocally in a position of desirable dependence, having well sur-
passed the Society’s temporal soft maximum to a departmental position of de facto 
permanence. He was clearly unperturbed by his own formal encompassment by 
his colleague. The latter could have been a king but was not, implying Axel did not 
sense a political disparity matching the hierarchical, echoing Dumont’s distinction 
between status and power. One aspect of his experience is particularly instructive: 
the possession of a degree of distance from the skills and interests of the direc-
tor. The latter was of an experimentalist bent, while Axel was highly theoretical. 
Indeed, when speaking to them together one sensed a strong divergence in their 
proclivities but also the way that it facilitated a fizzing synergy. Despite remain-
ing loyal to the director’s vision, Axel had therefore always had his own ideas and 
methods. He showed that the best way to navigate dependence was to carve out as 
large a space of autonomy as was possible within it.
Benjamin was also a male scientist in his forties, but this time an independent 
researcher of lesser longevity who cut a rather different figure. He expressed him-
self with more austerity than Axel and could be quick to temper, but his loquacious 
and avuncular manner made him popular with the younger students. Benjamin 
joined the department from Spain in 2006 through a personal link to the director, 
who was distantly connected to some of the research he was doing there. The agree-
ment they had negotiated before his arrival was from the outset a compromise: 
Benjamin had some “fascinating questions” he wanted to answer on one topic, 
while the director was keen for him to use his expertise to pursue another. In the 
end they mutually agreed he could work on both and see how things progressed. 
For a long while Benjamin clearly thrived in the creative and technologically first-
rate environment that the MPS could be. He had built eight separate experimental 
machines from scratch—each serving the purpose of answering its own specific 
scientific question—and told me that such a high degree of innovation would have 
been unheard of at his previous institution, where they would trundle out the same 
are more generative, or more provocatively, that women are more likely to be culturally 
inscribed to accept dependence and therefore less reflective on the relation.
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old devices for years on end. There at the Institute one felt one was really doing 
“hardcore science.” At times, jarring curiously with these bursts of enthusiasm, 
Benjamin would veer off into nostalgic soliloquies of social decay. The informa-
tional anarchy wrought by the Internet would spell the end of traditional pedagogy, 
he was sure. The trouble with modern science is that it is completely technologi-
cally determined, he avowed. Their underlying theme was always of a deterioration 
of human agency in some or other realm from its prior state of realization. I did not 
give much thought to these at the time; it was only the following year on returning 
to the Institute that I began to feel that something else was being communicated.
Over cups of tea in his tall-ceilinged Berlin apartment, Benjamin and I talked at 
length about the hierarchical arrangement of the Max Planck Society, in which he 
was adamant he did not “fit.” In stark contrast to Axel, for Benjamin the organiza-
tion maintained a very rigid division of labor. “You have a director who gives gen-
eral directions but then meets with his deputies, and then they execute their direc-
tor relations with the PhDs and postdocs, who then work with the technicians.” The 
subject led him naturally to the predicament faced by those in his position—inde-
pendent researchers and group leaders—whom he called the “intermediate tier.”30
“The whole pressure is on the intermediate tier. Three to six years after complet-
ing your (doctoral) degree, you are expected to enter this intermediate tier. But up 
to ten years after completing your degree, you are expected to no longer be there. 
Because if you do get stuck there, there are legal issues and the MPI has to take you 
on as a permanent employee which is not going to happen.”
Benjamin’s testimony was not completely accurate. There are permanent posi-
tions available for this tier, although they are comparatively rare and depend on 
what one can “negotiate” with the director in question.31 Yet this sense of a ticking 
clock was quite common among scientists at his level. Benjamin now realized the 
director was never going to permit him to pursue his “fascinating questions” by 
awarding him a group leader position; thus the only option that remained to him 
was to exit the organization entirely. I inquired about possible next steps, but Ben-
jamin was recalcitrant. He resisted discussing the future and warned me away from 
such a “pungent topic.” After a couple of hours I left his apartment beset by some 
anxiety I could not name. Later that night I woke up at 4am with a start—some-
thing I rarely do. The nightmare I had fled involved the two of us talking in his 
apartment together when the director suddenly loomed into the scene, the charge 
between them somehow baleful. Soon after I bid my final farewell to the Institute I 
discovered that Benjamin had left not long afterward, his five years finally up.
Everything Benjamin said points to his experience of dependence as a mode of 
inaction. His word choices alone reveal much: the MPS is a place one gets “stuck”; 
its social structure is compared to an army; the question of his next move is noth-
ing less than effluvial. Moreover the psychological troubles familiar to precarity 
theorists are clearly manifest. The absence of any “shadow of the future” (Standing 
30. In German this hierarchical level is sometimes referred to as the Mittelbau.
31. I am informed by the administration that the director is “free to decide” whom s(he) 
wants to offer a permanent position—if s(he) has a free position covered by his or her 
budget. The only limiting factor is that the director cannot make any more permanent 
appointments five years before retirement.
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2011: 20), and an existential anxiety (which seeps its way into my dreamscape) 
appear frequently among those on temporary contracts. What is particular about 
precarity here, however, is that these were all direct consequences of a primary re-
lation between him and the director. Indeed Benjamin’s case is a salutary example 
of how personalized this relation can be. Without one individual’s willingness to 
encompass his research, his capacity for action inside the entire organization had 
evaporated. It is subsequently not as Ferguson’s argument would suggest, that in 
the achievement of dependence alone possibilities for advancement are necessar-
ily opened up. Dependence in the MPS can be highly undesirable, if the delicate 
balance of autonomy and encompassment between these two scientists is not 
reached.
Of the three, Faris had been employed in the department for the shortest time: 
just two years. Originally from a war-torn nation in the Middle East, he was a gre-
garious and bear-like fellow, with a nimbus of black curls framing a benevolent 
face. Like Benjamin, Faris was an independent researcher. Nevertheless what dis-
tinguished him from Benjamin (and indeed from Axel) was that the dust had not 
yet settled on his relationship with the director. My stay in the department co-
incided with a critical professional moment for him, in which he was delicately 
negotiating his position in the department: a process that would have profound 
medium-term—and even long-term—implications. Faris’s experience consequent-
ly enables us to see in practice how the dependence relation can be manipulated by 
the dependent to the mutual advantage of both parties.
Like many scientists in the department, Faris was characteristically affable: his 
countenance curved constantly upward into a slightly sheepish grin. I was sur-
prised therefore to find him on the day of our discussion slumped slightly at his 
desk, surrounded by an atmosphere of mild despair. I did not have to inquire as to 
the provenance of this grey mood as he immediately began to explain his predica-
ment. When he had first arrived in the department it was as a specialist in nano-
tubes and so at the behest of the director a technician had purchased the equip-
ment he needed to investigate them, assembled everything, and was in charge of 
operating it. Then the technician left. The vacancy thus fell naturally to Faris as the 
only other person there with the necessary expertise, and since then he had been 
training other scientists in the department to use it and assisting them with their 
experiments alongside his own. While he enjoyed this he realized it placed him in 
a bind. “I got really into it and became this technique-oriented guy, and now this 
is what I’m fighting every single day. I’m not a technician and I’m not going to be 
a technician.” Faris was in the eye of the storm Benjamin identified, which envel-
ops “the intermediate tier”: i.e., that in three years’ time he will be expected to “no 
longer be there” and time was running out. Although his name appeared on an 
impressive proportion of the publications the department produces, this was for 
technical assistance rather than intellectual authorship; he was acutely conscious 
it was only the latter that would ensure his professional survival in the field. Faris 
ended our talk with what sounded like a solemn injunction to his future self, “One 
must be careful to define one’s own piece of cake, and not be part of someone else’s 
piece of cake.”
When we met again many months later, it was manifest this injunction must 
have worked. In the intervening period Faris had managed to maneuver himself 
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into an advantageous position, from which he would “be able to compete” for a 
university post. He would not formally be a group leader but would have a small 
cluster of PhD students and perhaps a postdoctoral fellow around him and his re-
search interests, according him the requisite intellectual distance from the direc-
tor to secure his own future. Now—he informed me—he had several publications 
on which the director was not the coauthor, and felt “much more confident” as a 
result because it showed he had his “own ideas” rather than simply “copying.” This 
was not necessarily a linear process. Faris was “lucky” because the experiments he 
carried out with his technique were a categorical success, and the director could 
clearly witness a wealth of scientific potential opening up. This meant it was easier 
to “convince [the director] that it was a nice project.” Now convinced, however, 
the support the director was giving him was unequivocal. The latter “will fund 
everything I am doing” and is “giving me incredible freedom,” Faris gushed. His 
positivity in that moment was undiluted, and scaled up to encompass his views on 
the organization and science in general. Instead of the rigid quadripartite struc-
ture outlined by Benjamin, he—like Axel—emphasized the department’s “relaxed” 
character. Instead of those parables of constraint, Faris confidently asserted that as 
a scientist “our only job is being creative.” Faris now knew that when his five years 
expired there was a good chance he would move into a university position or be 
given a contract to stay longer, and the brightness of this imagined future illumi-
nated his every utterance.
The processual nature of Faris’s testimony demonstrates a further aspect of 
dependence, less stark in the previous examples. Whether consciously or not, he 
has clearly solved the problem of value inside the MPS and is strategizing his way 
through it. In so doing, Faris offers an ethnographic critique of Dumont and of 
structuralism in general: that, as Rupert Stasch points out, people do not simply 
live “within” sets of cultural ideas but also utilize these self-same ideas to “craft 
judgements and take positions” (2002: 337).32 Faris was highly reflexive about how 
the organization “works”—but rather than admonishing dependence through the 
prism of liberal common sense he had instead constituted it as a classic Ferguso-
nian mode of action. He was carefully placing himself into an excellent position 
from which to make the leap to the universities: the ideal trajectory that the Society 
would wish for its post-PhD staff.
Before concluding the discussion it is worth pointing out that the Harnack Prin-
ciple does not simply shape the personhood of directors. Rather, like all discourses 
of value it tumbles through the social order. Faris was similarly asserting both au-
tonomy and excellence from within his own hierarchical position. He had carved 
out his “own piece of cake” using his “own ideas,” and evidencing great scientific 
success in the process. Nevertheless we should still not confuse encompassed and 
encompassing values. Faris’s autonomy remained qualitatively different to that of 
the director. Just that simple phrase “he is giving me incredible freedom” tells us 
all—that the capacity for action is a hierarchical gift, not a universal right. The 
Max Planck Society is not populated by abstract liberal individuals but instead by 
32. As Iteanu and Moya rightly point out, “Dumont is not terribly interested in the Indian 
person qua agent” (2015: 122).
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persons suspended in webs of functional complementarity. It is then from within 
these webs that they may be able to weave their way into positions of temporal 
security.
Conclusion
The comparatively extreme precarity of scientists in the Max Planck Society has 
been widely discussed in the German media (Reif 2012; Müller 2012), as indeed 
has its social “formula” (Kröher 2013) and the possible pitfalls thereof (Grünewald 
2014). What remains underdiscussed and undertheorized, is that these two phe-
nomena are created in the very same movement. The Society’s discourse of au-
tonomy—enshrined in its founder’s purported “principle”—is as pronounced 
a discourse of dependency as it is of autonomy, only that the latter is never ex-
plicitly articulated. Particularly in the natural sciences that have been our focus, 
fully qualified researchers are indispensable to an intellectual division of labor that 
serves to realize the director’s vision. Autonomy and dependency are thus not only 
fundamentally linked, but in fact coproduce one another in their very emergence. 
This would indicate that solving problems of precarity among MPS scientists is not 
simply a question of lengthening contracts, as these reports would suggest, but one 
that—if it is to have enduring success—must confront the institutionalization of 
inherited ideas of intellectual leadership.
Such syllogistic reasoning is potentiated by a Dumontian analysis that places 
persons before people. Rather than navigating some kind of representational void, 
it means that people act—often reflexively—from within social functions pre-
scribed to them. Personhood does not remain static, however, and the century-
long history of the organization demonstrates the changing discourse of values 
therein—one that has produced slightly different models of personhood over the 
years. Nevertheless, what has persisted to the present day is a conception of the 
professional dependency of some persons upon others, dependencies that are 
now frequently expressed through a neoliberal preference for temporary working 
contracts.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress in these final remarks that like any so-
cial organization with a more or less coherent set of values, the MPS is morally 
ambivalent. Here Ferguson’s contribution has been invaluable. He makes a self-
consciously provocative claim by stressing the ethnographic existence of “desir-
able” dependence, and it is one that has shed a similar light here. Indeed it is only by 
de-pathologizing dependence that the positive professional outcomes for Axel and 
Faris can be fully understood. Encompassment by a given director may open up a 
mode of action if subaltern staff are able to cannily assert their own autonomy and 
excellence within it, just as Faris’s success with his technique is not subsumed by the 
director’s research outputs (although no doubt assisting a positive appraisal in the 
Fachbeirat), but becomes a way for him to advance professionally within and be-
yond the organization. Yet the case of Benjamin obstructs an interpretation of de-
pendence as unequivocally desirable. With its roots in German monarchy, that the 
scientific whole is encompassed by a single individual means that the dependence 
relation is profoundly individualized, as it is not in Ferguson’s southern African 
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case. Dependency’s relative desirability then becomes contingent upon the quality 
of this interpersonal encounter. Shortly before I left the Institute for Nanoscience, 
a PhD student remarked to me that she found it surprising that Axel was permit-
ted to stay beyond the five-year term while Benjamin was not. Compared to other 
academic institutions it was indeed surprising, but within the Max Planck Society it 
was simply one rational outcome of an internal logic of individualized dependency. 
If post-PhD staff fail to harmonize to the obligatory relation of individual encom-
passment, they must accept the inevitability of social death.
Considering precarity as dependence, however, has implications beyond this 
German organization. It possesses the potential to rechannel the intellectual re-
sources recovered by Ferguson into new social and political resources. For if a po-
sition of precarity in the form of temporary employment is equivalent to a social 
condition of hierarchical dependence, then it can no longer be an epiphenomenon 
of impersonal neoliberal forces. In fact, it would suggest that the framing hitherto, 
of precarity as somehow impersonal works in practice to exculpate the specific ac-
tors driving its distribution across the world. In the Max Planck Society at least, the 
intimacy of this relation can give directors a strong sense of responsibility to those 
who depend on them. In the wider world such reciprocities may be harder to trace 
but that makes it all the more pressing that we do so. Only by suturing apparently 
discrete human situations—of precarity and security, or autonomy and dependen-
cy, or even of land-ownership and tenancy—will we be able to live ethically and to 
hold those who have power to account.
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Précarité académique que la dépendance hiérarchique dans la Société 
Max Planck
Résumé : Cet essai examine les spécificités de la hiérarchie interne d’une des plus 
larges institutions de recherche en Allemagne, la Société Max Planck. L’essai dé-
ploie une analyse inspirée par Louis Dumont, ses concepts de valeur cardinale, 
d’englobement, et de complémentarité afin d’explorer la logique symbolique des re-
lations au sein de cette structure. Par conséquent, l’article démontre que les valeurs 
cardinales d’autonomie et d’excellence de l’institution (incarnées par le comité des 
gouverneurs, englobant leurs départements respectifs) produisent la valeur com-
plémentaire de dépendance des subalternes. L’étude ethnographique auprès de trois 
scientifiques post-doctorat révèle que la dépendance est effectivement constituée 
comme un “mode d’action” (au sense de James Ferguson), dépendant de l’appui des 
directeurs. L’essai se termine en suggérant que l’omnipresence des contrats tempo-
raires parmi ces acteurs n’est pas simplement—et comme beaucoup le pensent—
l’effet dune précarisation générale et néolibérale de la recherche. La précarité de 
l’emploi au sein de la société Max Planck est en fait l’expression contemporaine de 
dépendances initiées par une tradition plus ancienne de gestion du travail intellec-
tuel et de la morphologie de la monarchie Allemande avant cela. 
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